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COiM[MENT
COMPETITIVE BIDDING-PUBLIC CONSTRUCTION
CONTRACTS IN THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
The expanding demand for a multitude of public facilities, such as
highways, schools, and sewers, brought about by continually increasing
urban population, has created a growing potentiality for legal difficulty
in the area of competitive bidding for public construction contracts.
This comment will offer a brief exposure to the problems encountered
under present Washington practice. The formalities of the bidding
process and the bidder's attempted withdrawal will be discussed. Pri-
mary emphasis will be given to the challenge of an award of a contract.
To date, the courts have been reluctant to interfere with an award
without a clear showing of fraud or abuse of discretion.' Presently,
there are indications that the "hands off" attitude of the courts is
being subjected to question from within as well as from outside the
judiciary. The broad scope of review apparently afforded by the
Washington Administrative Procedure Act,' combined with an incli-
nation on the part of some courts to afford more effective relief to the
disappointed bidder, promises a probable increase in litigation.
In Washington, bidding procedures are controlled by a number of
statutes. These have been set out in the appendix for the convenience
of the reader. For the most part these statutes are unrelated in scope
or content.3 The lack of uniformity in statutory pattern and the
countless variations in administrative practice make any generalization
dangerous. However, a brief statement of the general pattern is set
out in the footnotes. 4
1 Stern v. Spokane, 60 Wash. 325, 329, 111 P.2d 231 (1910), In Re Harmon, 52
Wn.2d 118, 323 P2d 653 (1958), Smith v. Hallenbeck, 48 Wn2d 461, 294 P.2d 921
(1956), State ex rel. Printing-Litho Inc. v. Wilson, 128 S.E.2d 449 (W. Va. 1962), and
generally 10 McQuILN, MUNiCiPAL. C0opoRATioNs § 29.73 (3rd ed. 1950).
2 RCW 34.04.
3 See the text of the pertinent statutes set out in the appendix.
4The determination of whether competitive bidding is required is generally made
on the basis of the dollar value of the work. When competitive bidding is required
the state must publish, for a specified time, a "call" for bids. Interested contractors
may acquire proposal forms and file their bids with the proper authorities. "Pre-
qualification" may be required in some instances. The bid must comply with the
requirements of the statute and the advertisement in order to qualify for consideration.
Each bid must be accompanied by a bond, certified check or deposit to guarantee that
the bidder, if successful, will execute the formal contract. In the call for bids, an
opening date is set at which time the bids will be publicly opened and read. It is
generally understood that a bidder may withdraw his bid up to the time of opening.
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FoRuALI ES OF THE BIDDING PROCESS
In order to create a valid contract, the state and the contractor
must follow certain prescribed procedures. The initial step in the
letting of a contract is the determination of whether competitive bid-
ding is required. Once this question is answered in the affirmative, the
applicable statute must be consulted to determine the steps to follow.
It appears to be settled law throughout the country that if a factual
situation requires competitive bidding, failure to meet that require-
ment voids any resulting contract.5 In some situations the contractor
who has performed under such an invalid contract may recover the
reasonable value of work completed.' Where the requirement of com-
petitive bidding depends upon the dollar value of the work exceeding
a specified amount, an interesting question may arise concerning the
authority of the state to breakdown a particular job into smaller units
for the purpose of avoiding the bidding requirement When the ob-
vious purpose of the break down is to avoid the statute, the courts
have generally held the resulting contract invalid.' Where it appears
A withdrawal after that point raises considerable uncertainty and forfeiture of the
accompanying bond or check may result.
Generally no contract is awarded immediately after opening, nor is the apparent low
bidder assured of receiving the award. Rather the state reseves the right to consider
the bids and to notify the successful bidder at a later date. If no bid meets with the
approval of the state, or if all bids are over the engineer's estimate it is generally
recognized that the state may reject all bids and re-advertise.
In determining the successful bidder the state may consider factors other than the
dollar amount of the bid submitted. The general statutory scheme contemplates dis-
cretion in the official to accept the bid that will be most beneficial to the public. Once
the successful bidder is notified and gives a performance bond, then the formal contract
will be executed. If he declines to enter the formal contract, it may be awarded to
another bidder or a new call may be made.
Any discussion of problems under the various bidding procedures is made exceed-
ingly difficult by the existence of a multitude of rules and regulations promulgated by
the various administrative agencies. The attorney confronted by a problem in the area
should first consult the particular agency to ascertain whether it has ruled on the
question. If there is a ruling the problem then becomes one of the extent of the
agency's authority. DAvis, ADmiNsITRATI LAW ch. 5 (1958). Because of the number
of agencies and the variation in the extent and substance of their rulings, it is im-
possible to include a discussion of their impact within the confines of this comment.
Discussion will therefore be limited to regulations of the Washington State Highway
Commission.
5 10 McQur.LIN, op. cit. suprta note 1, § 29.30. See also Hilliard v. Seattle,
63 Wn2d 401, 387 P.2d 536 (1963), Hailey v. King County, 21 Wn2d 53, 149
P.2d 823 (1944). The court has shown its intent to construe the requirement of the
statutes with regard to the legislative purpose in calling for competitive bidding and
with a policy against limiting the reach of such statutes. Reiter v. Chapman, 177
Wash. 392, 31 P.2d 1005 (1934). However, where not required by the legislature,
competitive bidding will not be required by the courts. Dalton v. Clarke, 18 Wn.2d
322, 139 P.2d 291 (1943). See also 10 McQtJILN, op. dt. supra note 1, § 29A1.
6 O'Connor v. Murray, 152 Wash. 519, 278 Pac. 176 (1929), Besoloff v. Whatcom
County, 140 Wash. 180, 248 Pac. 381 (1926).
7 Annot., 53 A.L.R2d 498 (1957).
8 Id. at 499.
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that the official has acted in good faith, his action is generally upheld.'
No Washington case has expressly considered the point. Practically
speaking, the question is unlikely to arise in Washington because the
great majority of contracts involve a higher amount than the low
figures set by the statutes."0
Where competitive bidding is required, the state must comply with
the formal procedures set out in the applicable statute." Failure to
do so will also result in a void contract. 2 Where the statute requires
that notice or a call for bids be posted for a prescribed period, this
requirement must be met.' Where competitive bidding is required, it
must be competitive in fact. The state may not so word its advertise-
ment so as to restrict competition. 4 Thus, an advertisement phrased
so that only one contractor could comply with the specifications would
not meet the requirement of competitive bidding. However, the Wash-
ington court has held that the state may specify a patented article in
an advertisement for bids.'5 Such a position seems contrary to the
policies of competitive bidding in that only one product can meet the
specifications, but it is thought to be the better rule by at least one
eminent writer. 6
Assuming that the state meets the requirements of the statute, the
contractor must submit a bid which is responsive to the advertisement
before the state will consider it.' Generally the state will waive any
minor irregularities, particularly where the other bidders consent.'
Practically speaking, any irregularity may cause the state to refuse
to consider the bid and even if the refusal is wrongful, there is little
the contractor can do to obtain effective relief.'
The ability of the state to accept a bid which is not responsive to
the advertisement raises a somewhat different question. It is often
stated that where a variance is material the state cannot legally award
the contract.0 An immaterial variance may validly be waived by the
9 Ibid. See also 10 MCQUILLIN, op. cit. supra note 1, § 29.33 and cases cited.
10 See appendix.
1 10 MCQUILLIN, op. cit. supra note 1, § 29.41.
12 Ibid.
"3Reiner v. Clark County, 137 Wash. 194, 241 Pac. 973 (1926), Wyant v. Inde-
pendent Asphalt Co., 118 Wash. 345, 203 Pac. 961 (1922).
14 10 MCQUILLIN, op. cit. supra note 1, § 29.44.
1 Smith v. Seattle, 192 Wash. 64, 72 P.2d 588 (1937).
16 10 MCQUILLIN, op. cit. supra note 1, § 29.42.
'- Shields v. Seattle, 79 Wash. 308, 140 Pac. 353 (1914). See also Annot., 65 A.L.R.
835 (1930).
18 Annot., 65 A.L.R. 835, 838 (1930).
'9 Seattle Const. & Dry Dock Co. v. Newell, 81 Wash. 144, 142 Pac. 481 (1914).
20 Application of Glen Truck Sales & Service Inc., 31 Misc.2d 1027, 220 N.Y.S2d
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state. The test for determining the materiality of a variance is gen-
erally stated in terms of whether the bidder's proposal gives him "an
advantage or benefit which is not enjoyed by other bidders.""1 Such a
test raises difficult questions of fact which must be resolved case by
case. However, the problem is not one which lends itself to any other
method of analysis, and it is likely the cases will continue to turn on
close factual questions with considerable deference given the admin-
istrative discretion. The Washington court has not expressly considered
the point.
WITHDRAWN OFFES
It is generally recognized in the setting of private negotiation, that
a bid is simply an offer to enter into a contract. Unless consideration
is found for a promise by the contractor to hold the offer open he is
free to withdraw until his offer is accepted.22 This elementary contract
principle causes considerable conceptual difficulty when placed in a
public contract setting.
Due to procedures followed in Washington and in other states, there
is considerable delay between the submission of bids and the execution
of a formal contract.2" In most instances the state makes no binding
acceptance until the execution.2" Thus, it would seem that the bidder
would be free to withdraw until the binding acceptance. In order to
dissuade the successful bidder from withdrawal, which would cause
delay and expense to the state, the Washington statutes require each
bid to be accompanied by a deposit, certified check or bid bond.2 This
requirement does not make the bid irrevocable but merely causes for-
feiture if the attempted withdrawal takes place too late in the bidding
process. The difficulty arises in attempting to determine the point in
time at which the bidder may no longer withdraw without forfeiture.
In order to protect the state effectively, the contractor's power to re-
voke without forfeiture should be terminated at some time prior to a
939 (Sup. Ct. 1961), Chick's Const. Co. v. Wachusett Reg. High School Dist., 343
Mass. 38, 175 N.E.2d 502 (1961). See also 10 McQumtir, op. cit. supra note 1, §
29.68.
21 Claus v. Babiarz, 185 A2d 283, 287 (Del. 1962). Compare weith National Eng. &
Const. Co. v. City of Cleveland, 76 Ohio L. Abs. 303, 146 N.E2d 340 (1957) and Duffy
v. Village of Princeton, 240 Minn. 9, 60 N.W.2d 27 (1953).
221 CoRBrN, CoNTRAC S § 24 (1950). Also see generally Schultz, Firm Offer
Pursle, 19 U. CmI. L. REv. 237 (1952).
2 3 See appendix.
241 Coaair, CoNTRAc S § 47 (1963). See also WAsHE. STATE HIGHwAY Comm'x,
STANDARD SpECICATIONS FOR RoAD AND BRIDGE CoNSTRUCrION (1963).
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binding acceptance by the state. The present Washington system does
not seem to offer this protection.
REQUIREMENT OF DEPOSIT OR CERTIFIED CHECK. Where the state
seeks to retain a cash deposit or certified check upon the successful
bidder's withdrawal the significant factor seems to be whether the bid
has been accepted prior to the withdrawal. An early Washington case
allowed a successful bidder to withdraw without forfeiture of a certified
check accompanying his bid on grounds that the bid had not yet been
accepted and thus there could be no "mutuality. 2 2
Where there is a reservation on the part of a municipality to reject any
and all bids, there can be no mutuality until the bid is accepted, and
until it is accepted, the proposer is under no obligation to keep it good,
but may withdraw it.27
Thus the threat of forfeiture is ineffective until acceptance. Other
Washington authority has upheld the forfeiture of a certified check
where the withdrawal followed the state's acceptance.2"
The only difficulty left by these cases is a bothersome failure of the
court to clearly outline whether the acceptance it speaks of must con-
tractually bind the state. May the acceptance the court refers to be
the notification given to the bidder that his bid is the apparent low bid
and is accepted? As stated earlier, this acceptance does not generally
bind the state. However, some courts have allowed the state to keep
the deposit without analyzing the effect of the acceptance."0 Others
have found consideration for an implied promise not to withdraw in
the state's consent to give the bid fair and impartial attention. 0 Thus,
the contractor cannot be certain of the effect of his attempted with-
drawal. A further difficulty is raised by the use of the certified check
in that there is considerable authority which would allow the drawer to
stop payment on such a check."' At present, Washington bankers will
honor a stop payment although there is no Washington case which
supports their view.
25 See appendix.
26 Seattle Const. & Dry Dock Co. v. Newell, 81 Wash. 144, 142 Pac. 481 (1914).
21 Id. at 146, 142 Pac. at 483.
28 Harrington v. State, 124 Wash. 138, 213 Pac. 449 (1923), Hilstad v. Kitsap
County, 124 Wash. 595, 215 Pac. 12 (1923).
29 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 47 (1963). Other fact questions can arise. Where does
acceptance occur? At opening? Is notification to the bidder a prerequisite? When is
notification effective?
30 See Keyes, Consideration Reconsidered-the Problem of the Withdrawn Bid, 10
STAN. L. REV. 441 (1957-58).3
'BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES § 180 (2d ed. 1961), 1 PATTON, DIGEST OF LEGAL
OPINIONS § 10:C 2 (1940).
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. REQUIREMENT OF A Bm BOND. Many of the problems discussed
above are alleviated where a bid bond is required in lieu of a deposit
or certified check.12 The bid bond obligates a surety, generally a bond-
ing company, to pay a stated amount should the contractor fail to
enter into a formal contract after being declared the successful bidder."3
When a bonding company is involved there is no need to consider
whether or not there is consideration for the bidder's implied promise
not to withdraw. The promise is that of the bonding company for
which consideration is given by the bidder. In a sense the state is the
third party beneficiary of a contract between the contractor and the
bonding company.3 In any case the fact of whether or not the state
has become contractually bound prior to the attempted withdrawal is
immaterial to the question of the liability of the bonding company."
The liability of the bonding company depends entirely upon the scope
of its promise. The general understanding appears to be that the com-
pany's obligation becomes operative at the opening of the bid. It can
be argued that the obligation does not arise until the bid has been
accepted, in the sense of notifying the successful bidder, and runs
until the formal contract is executed." Such an argument has not been
precluded and would seem to have some logical support.
SUGGESTED SOLUTION TO THE WITHDRAWN OFFER PROBLEM. Of
the various methods used throughout the country to clarify the with-
drawn offer problem the most effective is legislation stating bids shall
be irrevocable at some point in the bidding process. The most logical
point in time to withdraw the power to revoke seems to be the opening
32 Most of the Washington statutes are worded in the alternative and would allow
either a bid bond or certified check to accompany a bid.
33 See generally the statutes set out in the appendix. Also note the surety bond
form in WAsHi. STATE HIGHWAY COMM'N, op. cit. supra note 24, § 79 (1963), the text
of which is set out in footnote 36 infra.34 Keyes, supra note 30, at 458; Contra, Peerless Casualty Co. v. Housing Authority,
228 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1955), noted, 36 Nan. L. REv. 618 (1957).
35 Keyes, supra note 30, at 458.
313 With regard to such an argument, it is interesting to note that the "Proposal
Bond" required by the Washington State Highway Commission is at best somewhat
vague in its language.
Now, Therefore, If the said proposal bid by said principal be accepted, and the
contract be awarded to said principal, and if said principal shall duly make and
enter into and execute said contract and shall furnish bond as required by that
State Highway Commission within a period of twenty (20) days from and after
said award, exclusive of the day of such award, then this obligation shall be null
and void, otherwise it shall remain and be in full force and effect. (Emphasis
added.)
WAsH. STATE HiGHWAY COMS'N, op. cit. supra note 24, § 79. See also §§ 2.06, 2.08,
3.01, 3.02 and 3.07.
37 See Keyes, supra note 30.
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since it gives adequate protection to the state without unduly dis-
couraging prospective bidders. Such a law would preclude any question
of lack of consideration for a promise to keep the bid open as the
legislature's power to do away with this element of a contract is beyond
question. 8 The Washington statutes contain no such pronouncement
and as a result the contractor cannot effectively predict the effect of
his withdrawal.
MISTAKE. The contractor who can show evidence of a material
mistake in his bid is generally allowed to withdraw the bid, without
forfeiting bond, where the mistake is made known to the state within
a reasonable time after opening.89 In the Puget Sound Painters" case
the contractor erroneously omitted one-half of the work to be done in
computing his bid. In an action to enjoin the forfeiture of the bid
bond, the contractor, having given notice to the state prior to the
acceptance of its bid, was allowed relief. The court stated:
We are convinced that the opinion in the Donaldson case establishes the
principle or policy in this jurisdiction: that equity will relieve against
forfeiture of a bid bond, (a) if the bidder acted in good faith, and
(b) without gross negligence, (c) if he was reasonably prompt in giving
notice of the error in the bid to the other party, (d) if the other party's
status has not greatly changed, and relief from forfeiture will work no
substantial hardship on him.4'
Thus the Washington court's abhorrence of forfeiture affords the mis-
taken bidder an excellent opportunity to withdraw without detriment.
This privileged withdrawal for mistake raises another problem. If a
bidder withdraws his bid on grounds of mistake, the state is left with
three alternatives. It may allow the mistaken bidder to modify the
bid and re-enter it, awarding the contract if the bid is low. It may
award the contract to the second low bidder; or it may reject all bids
and re-advertise. The first alternative is rarely followed unless the
mistake is minor and other bidders consent. The contractors' associa-
tions generally favor the second alternative as it does not allow the
negligent contractor to ultimately benefit from his mistake. The third
alternative is apparently favored by the state for the reason that the
38 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS 180 (1950), 10 McQUrLLIN, op. cit. supra note 1, § 29.67,
Baltimore v. J. L. Robinson Const. Co., 123 Md. 660, 91 Atl. 682 (1914), M. F. Kemper
Const. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 37 Cal.2d 696, 235 P.2d 7 (1951).
89 Puget Sound Painters v. State, 45 Wn.2d 819, 278 P.2d 302 (1954), Donaldson
v. Abraham, 68 Wash. 208, 122 Pac. 1003 (1912), 10 McQun.LIx, op. cit. supra note 1,
§§ 29.67, 29.82, Shattuck, Contracts it Washington, 34 WASH. L. R v. 467, 530 (1959),
Annot., 52 A.L.R.2d 792 (1957), Annot., 70 A.L.R2d 1370 (1960).
4o 45 Wn2d 819, 278 P.2d 302 (1954). 41 Id. at 823, 278 P.2d at 304.
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public is expected to benefit in a second call for bids.2 If the first or
third alternative is chosen, the mistaken bidder may use to his advan-
tage the information derived at the public opening. At the second call,
with knowledge of the amount of other bids, he may place his bid so
as to receive the award at the highest possible figure. A bid figure
honestly reached will be unlikely to change to any substantial degree
at the second call as a contractor in theory bids as low as he thinks he
may to obtain the award at the first call. Thus, much of the risk of
the competitive nature of the bidding process can be removed by the
mistaken bidder with a little ingenuity. In some cases one might
wonder whether the mistake was intentional. The awarding of the
contract to the second low bidder would seem to be a workable solution
where that bid is not in excess of the engineer's estimate and is other-
wise acceptable to the state.
AwAD OF THE CONTRACT TO THE HIGHER BIDDER
Often the contractor that receives the award will not be the lowest
bidder. The lowest bid will be passed by for that of another on the
grounds that the other bidder has some quality which, in terms of
public interest, makes him the better candidate. When such a situation
occurs the disappointed low bidder is understandably upset. In some
cases he may suspect that the state's motives in granting the award
to his competitor were not altogether altruistic. His remedies seem
clear at this point. However, one soon discovers a number of imposing
obstacles in the path of effective judicial relief. These obstacles will
provide the basis for the discussion that follows.
LMITS OF DIsCRETION, SCOPE OF REviEW. The first question that
must be answered is whether the state has the power to award a con-
tract to other than the low bidder. The most common statement
concerning the award of the contract found in the Washington statutes
is couched in terms of "lowest responsible bidder.""3 This legislative
directive authorizes, in fact requires, the administrative body to exer-
cise discretion in awarding the contract to the bidder who offers in
the opinion of the officials, the best rather than the lowest bid.4 In
42 These statements are the opinion of the writer based on discussions with various
contractors and officials.
43 See appendix.
4 "[T]he bidder who is most likely, in regard to skill, ability and integrity, to do
faithful, conscientious work, and promptly fulfill the contract according to its letter
and spirit... ." is the most responsible bidder. 10 McQuILLIN, OP. cit. supra note 1,§ 29.73.
19641
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
determining the best bid, the state may, and perhaps must, consider a
multitude of factors other than the dollar amount of the bid." Even
where the statutory language specifically requires that the award be
made to the lowest bidder, there is discretion left to the state."
Modernly, there can be little doubt of the discretion to award to
other than the low bidder under the proper circumstances.," An at-
tempt to define the limits of that discretion or to determine what
constitutes an abuse quickly runs into heavy going. The primary
stumbling block to predictability is the unwillingness of the courts to
interfere with the determination of the administrative body. The legis-
lature has vested in the agency the authority to exercise its discretion
to determine the bid most advantageous to the public. In making the
determination the agency may call upon a wealth of knowledge and
experience which is unavailable to the court. The weighing of the
many technical factors which can come into play in determining the
relative qualifications of contractors is thought best left to the expertise
of the agency.
This court has expressed the view that courts should let administrative
boards and officers work out their problems with as little judicial inter-
ference as possible. One of the primary reasons for the creation of
administrative agencies is to secure the benefit of special knowledge ac-
quired through continuous experience in difficult and complicated fields.4
The courts often repeat the statement that they will not interfere with
an administrative determination in absence of fraud or arbitrary and
capricious action amounting to a clear abuse of discretion. 9 Moreover,
they refuse to lay down any standards by which the future exercise of
discretion can be judged, feeling that this is a task for the legislature."
It is thus exceedingly difficult to set down any reliable definition of
"lowest responsible bidder." About all that can be done is to recognize
45 For an example of some important considerations in determining who is the most
responsible bidder see RCW 43.19.1911, set out in full in the appendix.
4" "The responsibility of the bidder, his experience, and his facilities for carrying
out a contract, may be looked into, and an honest determination that on the whole
his bid will not be, in the long run, the lowest, will be entitled to control." Time
Publishing Co. v. Everett, 9 Wash. 518, 523, 37 Pac. 695, 696 (1894). See also 10
McQuILLIN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 351.
47 10 McQUILLIN, op. cit. supra note 1, § 29.72.
48 Robinson v. Olzendam, 38 Wn.2d 30, 37, 227 P.2d 732 (1951). See also Wash-
ington State Toll Bridge Auth. v. Yelle, 197 Wash. 110, 84 P.2d 688 (1938).
49 See cases and authorities cited note 1 supra.
50 "A hard and fast rule cannot be applied in ascertaining what is or is not an
abuse of discretion. Each case must be determined upon its own merits, taking into
consideration all of the facts and circumstances present." Washington State Toll
Bridge Auth. v. Yelle, 197 Wash. 110, 124, 84 P.2d 688, 694 (1938).
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some of the many elements that have been considered by various
courts in the past. Of course we have no assurance that these factors
would be considered important in a different situation and they might,
in some context, even be improper." Common elements often cited
by the court as significant include quality of materials proposed,
quality and quantity of equipment, ability, experience, reputation,
judgment, capacity, pecuniary responsibility, past defaults, and present
work load. 2 It cannot be overemphasized that mistake or bad judg-
ment on the part of the state are not grounds for challenging the
award. The failure of the state to consider a particular element, which
the disappointed bidder believes is significant, seldom leads to over-
turning the state's action so long, as other reasonable factors are
weighed.
At this juncture the effect of the Washington Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (APA) " becomes significant in predicting the court's future
position. Professor Cornelius J. Peck" speculated in 1958 that the
judicial review provisions of the new act would give less freedom to
the administrative agencies than was true under the law at that time."
Prior to the adoption of the statute, the court refused to substitute its
judgment in areas of administrative discretion due to the strong pre-
sumption of superior experience in the agency. The review provisions
of the APA appear to compel the court to subject the agency decision
to a more searching scrutiny.5
Only one Washington case has interpreted the review provisions of
the act.5 The results of this interpretation are inconclusive and a bit
confusing. The case involved a controversy over a proposed off-ramp
51 "The lowest responsible bidder . . . must be held to imply skill, judgment, and
integrity necessary to the faithful performance of the contract, as well as sufficient
financial resources and ability." 10 McQunmx, op. cit. supra note 1, at 353.
52 For a considerable listing of cases on the subject see 25 WoPns AND PHRASES
499 (1961), Annot., 27 A.L.R2d 917 (1956). See also RCW 43.19.1911, and Prequali-
fication form, note 65 infra.
53s RCW 34.04.
5" Professor of Law, University of Washington.
55 Peck, Scope of Judicial Review, 33 WAsH. L. Rxv. 55, 78 (1958).
56RCW 34.04.130 (6) provides: "The court may affirm the decision of the
agency or remand the case for further proceedings; or it may reverse the decision
if the substantial rights of the petitioners may have been prejudiced because the ad-
ministrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(a) in violation of constitutional provisions; or
(b) in excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency; or
(c) made upon unlawful procedure; or
(d) affected by other error of law; or
(e) unsupported by material and substantial evidence in view of the entire record as
submitted; or
(f) arbitrary or capricious!'57 State ex rel. Dawes v. State Highway Comm'n, 63 Wn.2d 34, 385 P2d 376 (1963).
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to a limited access freeway. The plan contemplated would have re-
quired the condemnation of part of the plaintiff's property and would
have deprived him of his access to the adjoining street. Relying on
the APA,"8 the plaintiff alleged that the findings and the order of the
highway commission were "arbitrary and capricious [and] unsup-
ported by substantial evidence." 9 The court found the provisions of
the APA applicable to the commission 0 and held that the commission
had complied with its requirements.6 '
The difficulty of the case is the method by which the court reaches
its conclusion. First the court asks:
Are the findings of fact and order of the highway commission arbitrary
and capricious, or unsupported by material and substantial evidence?
The court then quotes the long standing Washington test of arbitrary
and capricious action from Miller v. Tacoma.63 Applying this test the
court continues:
It is sufficient to state that we find nothing to indicate that the judgment
of the highway commission was not "exercised honestly and upon due
consideration" of the extensive record before it. We cannot say that the
action of the commission was arbitrary and capricious, or unsupported
by material and substantial evidence.
64
The test stated and apparently applied is solely to determine if the
commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously. Is the court equating
the "arbitrary and capricious" test with the "substantial evidence"
test? A more feasible explanation may be that the court found the
plaintiff's contention was without merit and merely failed to discuss it.
In any case the court has not indicated with clarity the extent to which
the APA will affect the scope of review. If Professor Peck's predictions
58 RCW 34.04.130 (6).
59 State ex reL. Dawes v. State Highway Comm'n, 63 Wn.2d 34, 40, 385 P.2d 376,
380 (1963).
60 State ex rel. Dawes v. State Highway Commn, 63 Wn.2d 34, 385 P.2d 376 (1963).
61 Ibid.
62 Id. at 40, 385 P.2d at 380.
63 61 Wn.2d 374, 390, 378 P.2d 464, 474 (1963). "Arbitrary and capricious action
has been defined as wilful and unreasoning action, without consideration and regard
for facts or circumstances. Lillions v. Gibbs, 47 Wn.2d 629, 633, 289 P.2d 203 (1955).
A finding of fact made without evidence in the record to support it, and an order
based upon such finding, is arbitrary. State ex rel. Tidewater-Shaver Barge Lines v.
Kuykendall, 42 Wn.2d 885, 891, 259 P.2d 838 (1953). Where there is evidence in the
record, however, and '. . . Where there is room for two opinions, action is not arbi-
trary and capricious when exercised honestly and upon due consideration, even though
it may be believed that an erroneous conclusion has been reached. [Citing authorities.].'
Smith v. Hollenbeck, 48 Wn.2d 461, 464, 294 P.2d 921 (1956)."
64 63 Wn.2d at 41, 385 P.2d at 381 (1963).
[VOL. 39
COMPETITIVE BIDDING
prove correct the impact upon the letting of public contracts may be
substantial. Other factors influence the bidder's relief as well.
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS. Some of the factors affecting the avail-
ability of relief to the disappointed bidder are practices of the state:
Generally speaking it is the state's practice to award to the lowest
bidder if any award is made. The use of "prequalification" increases
the probability of this result as allegedly unqualified contractors are
not allowed to bid."5
If an official wishes to favor a particular bidder he may do so prior
to the award in a number of ways. An official may leak information to
a favored bidder that allows him to easily underbid his competition.
For example the official may let it be known that some part of the
specifications will not be rigidly enforced. Or, specifications may be
written so that only one bidder may successfully comply with them.6"
This type of "cheating" is extremely difficult to uncover and even if
suspected, problems of proof are substantial.
RIGHT To REjECT. An almost plenary power to reject bids in the
hands of the state makes the use of the types of "cheating" discussed
above doubly effective in Washington. By exercising this discretion the
corrupt official may cause the rejection of bids over and over until the
favored bidder comes up a winner.
This power to reject for any reason springs from an early Washing-
65 The Washington State Highway Commission requires "prequalification" of a
contractor who wishes to bid upon any state highway work. RCW 4728.070. In order
to prequalify the contractor must furnish the highway commission with a completed
"Standard Questionnaire and Financial Statement" which can be obtained from the
commission. If the commission is dissatisfied with the completeness or sufficiency of
the contractors answers it may refuse to furnish the contractor with a "contract pro-
posal form" and may disregard any bid of said contractor. If the form is satisfactory
to the commission the commission advises the contractor of the kinds of work and the
amount of work for which he has been qualified. A refusal to allow the contractor to
bid is conclusive unless appealed to the superior court of Thurston county within five
days.
The form itself contains questions concerning:
(1) the experience of the firm and of its officers,
(2) the projects currently being undertaken by the firm,
(3) the projects completed within the past three years,
(4) the equipment owned and available for proposed work,
(5) the contractor's indication of what classes of work he feels he is qualified to
undertake,
(6) the maximum amount of work the contractor feels he is capable of undertaking
and
(7) the financial position of the firm to some detail.
Practically speaking the use of prequalification makes it more probable that the low
bidder will receive the award of the contract as the responsibility of the bidders in the
large part is determined at the prequalification level. For a case concerning a disputed
qualification see Caristo Constr. Co. v. Mars, 222 N.Y.S2d 998 (App. Div. 1961).66 Hodge & Hammon, Inc. v. Burns, 202 N.Y.S2d 133 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
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ton case, Bellingham American Publishing Co. v. Bellingham Pub-
lishing Co." The city of Bellingham advertised for bids for printing
and awarded the contract to the higher bidder of two. The disappointed
low bidder commenced an action to restrain the award and to compel
the award to himself. The city council then rejected all bids and called
for new bids. Again the plaintiff was the low bidder and again the bids
were rejected. At the third call the other bidder was low by a few cents
and the council awarded the contract to him. The court affirmed a
dismissal of the action. Since the city reserved the right to reject any
and all bids, the plaintiff had no grounds for relief.
In the call for bids, the right to reject any and all bids was reserved.
Under such a call, the question of the motive for rejection of bids is
immaterial. The fact, if it be a fact, that the rejection was arbitrary and
capricious does not present a case for injunctive relief. (Emphasis
added.)6"
Another statement from an earlier case typifies the court's feelings on
the matter:
In the case of Stern v. Spokane, 60 Wash. 325, 111 Pac. 231, we upheld
the right of the city council of the city of Spokane to exercise an almost
plenary power in the matter of refusing to contract under an invitation
reserving the right to reject any and all bids. (Emphasis added.)"
This element of the present Washington scheme is particularly dis-
turbing. The discretion of the state to reject all bids whether that
right is reserved by statute, ordinance, or in the invitation for bids
is almost universally recognized.70 The right is generally thought to be
unlimited.7' The question of whether the right must be exercised in
good faith has received little judicial consideration. Probably the lead-
ing case holding that motive immaterial is the Bellingham caseY.7  The
rationale behind the state's need for an absolute power to reject in the
public contract area is obscure. Surely the state must be held to a
higher standard of conduct than the private individual and should not
act arbitrarily.
The Bellingham case can probably be distinguished and limited to
67 145 Wash. 25, 258 Pac. 836 (1927).
6s Id. at 29, 258 Pac. at 837.
69 Seattle Const. & Dry Dock Co. v. Newell, 81 Wash. 144, 146, 142 Pac. 481, 482
(1914).7 0 Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 469 (1953). 10 MCQUILLIN, MuNcPA CORPORATIONS
§ 29.77 (3rd ed. 1950)
73 31 A.L.R.2d at 474.
72 145 Wash. 25, 258 Pac. 836 (1927).
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such an extent that its effect is negligible. In deciding the case the
Washington court relied upon Anderson v. Board of Public Schools.3
The latter case involved a suit for loss of profits by a contractor whose
low bid was rejected in favor of a higher bid. The plaintiff's theory in
the case was that the advertisement for bids constituted an offer which
he had accepted by his low bid. The refusal of the state to enter the
formal contract was alleged to be a breach. The court disposed of this
contention by holding that the advertisement was not an offer, and then
stated in dictum, that the motive of the board in rejecting the plain-
tiff's bid was immaterial." It was this dictum that was picked up in
the Bellingham case.
The validity of the Bellingham case may first be questioned in that
had the facts been on all fours with Anderson the Washington court
would have refused to follow Anderson. The court had stated that it
would interfere with the rejection of one bid in favor of another where
the rejection was fraudulent or an abuse of discretion."3 Thus the
Bellingham case may be limited to its facts. The motive of. the state
becomes immaterial only when all bids are rejected.. Even such a
narrow holding does not seem justifiable. There seems to be no -con-
ceivable logic in condoning the arbitrary or fraudulent action of an
official. A noted authority has stated:
In exercising the power to reject any or all bids, and proceeding anew
with the awarding of the contract, the officers cannot act arbitrarily or
capriciously, but must observe good faith and accord to all bidders just
consideration, thus avoiding favoritism, abuse of discretion, or cor-
ruption.76
Several cases in other states have recognized that the right to reject
must be exercised in good faith." Furthermore some indication can be
found that the Washington legislature does not acquiesce in the court's
position. The statutes setting up procedures for bidding on work or
supplies to be provided to school districts state that 'any or all bids
may be rejected for good cause."7 8 The highway commission may
reject all bids if in the opinion of the commission the acceptance of a
bid "will not be for the best interest of the state."" Other statutes
73122 Mo. 61, 27 S.W. 610 (1894).
71Id. at 612.
75 See text accompanying note 49 supra.
76 10 MCQUILLIN, op. cit. supra note 70, at 363.
'7Rugo v. Henson, 148 Conn. 430, 171 A2d 409 (1961).
78 RCW 28.58.135.
79RCW 47.28.100, RCW 4728.090.
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contain similar language: "if, in the opinion of the commission, all bids
are unsatisfactory, they may reject all of them .... I'll Some sections,
however, still contain only flat reservations of the right to reject with-
out any limiting language."' What effect the varying language will have
on the court is uncertain, but it is hoped that the Bellingham case will
have little influence in future litigation.
CHALLENGE By MOST INTERESTED PARTY. Probably the most in-
fluential factor in discouraging a disappointed bidder from seeking
judicial relief from an alleged wrongful award is the ineffective remedy
afforded him. Although it is clear that a taxpayer may challenge the
illegal award of a contract; s2 whether the most interested party, the
disappointed bidder, may sue in his own right is questionable. 3 Ob-
taining a taxpayer's name on the complaint does not involve an insur-
mountable difficulty, but the remedies available are geared to a tax-
payer's suit. Washington takes what is probably the majority position
in denying mandamus to compel the award to the disappointed bidder. 4
The basis of the denial of the writ is the existence of discretion in the
administrative official.8" The disappointed bidder cannot compel the
award of the contract to himself even where the action of the state is
an abuse of discretion and arbitrary." The only available procedure
is to seek an injunction restraining the state from entering a contract
beyond its authority." Thus, the bidder with a good cause of action
can at best hope to receive the opportunity to bid again on the par-
ticular contract. After incurring substantial expense, he has no assur-
ance that he will receive the award, nor has any Washington case
allowed him to recover damages.
Litigation over an allegedly illegal award has been discouraged by
the combination of factors discussed above. An absence of litigation
is not, in itself, harmful. However, where it is a symptom of the sys-
80 RCW 53.08.130, RCW 56.08.070, RCW 57.08.070, RCW 70.44.140.
81 RCW 35.43.190, RCW 52.12.110, RCW 54.04.080, RCW 86.05.430.
82 Peck, Standing Requirements, 35 WASH. L. Rav. 362, 381 (1960).
83 Ibid.
84 Bellingham Am. Publishing Co. v. Bellingham Publishing Co., 145 Wash. 25,
258 Pac. 836 (1927), Times Publishing Co. v. Everett, 9 Wash. 518, 37 Pac. 695(1894). See also State v. Showalter, 159 Wash. 519, 293 Pac. 1000 (1930), 17 Mc-
UILLIN, op. cit. supra note 70, § 51.52, Annot., 80 A.L.R. 1382 (1932).85 See cases and authorities cited note 84 supra.8 8 Bellingham Am. Publishing Co. v. Bellingham Publishing Co., 145 Wash. 25,
258 Pac. 836, 837 (1927). See also 17 MCQUILLIN, op. cit. rupra note 70, § 51.16.
Also consider id. § 51.18.
87 Bellingham Am. Publishing Co. v. Bellingham Publishing Co., supra note 86, at
28, 258 Pac. at 837.
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tem's failure to protect individual rights, some changes are called for.
Certainly it can be argued that no "right" of the disappointed bidder
has been infringed in these situations. However, if the competitive
nature of the bidding process is to be preserved, the party most inter-
ested in seeing that it remain uncorrupted should be given the means
to do so. This party is the bidder himself. A consideration of the
means leads us to a discussion of two recent federal cases.
DAmAGES TO TEm DISAPPOINTED BIDDER. The courts have long
taken the position that the disappointed bidder has no cause of action
against the state when the latter rejects the bidder's offer." Tested
against general contract principles this position seems clearly correct.
An individual would be quite skeptical if informed that he could
subject himself to possible liability by rejecting an offer. On the other
hand, where the state is a party there seem to be some compelling
reasons for requiring that an offer be given fair and impartial con-
sideration. The state should not be allowed to arbitrarily reject an
offer after causing the hopeful contractor to expend large sums of
money. This is the theory of the first of two federal cases.
In Heyer Products Co. v. United States," the court found a good
cause of action for the recovery of preparation expenses, where the
government failed to give the low bid fair and impartial consideration."0
The second case allowed an action for damages by the low bidder
where the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania awarded a contract to
another and in so doing maliciously interfered with the plaintiff's right
to secure a contract."1 Both of these cases have received considerable
interpretation and criticism by a number of legal writers and these
comments will not be repeated here. Suffice it to say that the award
of damages to the disappointed bidder, where there has been an abuse
of discretion, seems to be a desirable result. Such a remedy does not
unduly shackle the exercise of administrative discretion as it comes
into practice only where there is a clear abuse of discretion or fraud.
Damages provide an increased probability that the most interested
party, the disappointed bidder, will seek and attain justice. Couple
88 10 McQuILLIN, op. cit. supra note 70, § 29.77.
89 140 F.Supp. 409 (Ct. Cl. 1956).90 On remand the bidder was unable to prove his allegation. Heyer Products Co. v.
United States, 177 F.Supp. 251 (Ct. Cl. 1959). The Heyer case is discussed in the
following legal periodicals: Note, 70 HAtv. L. Rv. 564 (1956), Note, 105 U. PA. L.
Rav. 756 (1957), Note, 56 COLum. L. REv. 1239 (1956), Note, 36 NEB. L. Rv. 612
(1957).91 Highway Paving Co. v. Hausman, 171 F.Supp. 768 (E.D.Pa. 1959), noted in 59
CoLum. L. RFy. 953 (1959).
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this with an injunction restraining the state from entering the illegal
contract, and the public is adequately protected.
The majority of courts would probably take a position contrary to
that of the two cases discussed above. Nor can it be said that there
appears to be any growing trend in the minority direction. However,
the minority's position seems to this writer a sound one and one which
the Washington court might find persuasive.
At present there is not a considerable amount of litigation in the
area of competitive bidding. As the demand for public facilities con-
tinues to grow it seems inevitable that more and more of these problems
will find their way to the courts. The withdrawn offer and the wrongful
award of a contract are probable sources of the greatest potential
difficulty. Some far sighted legislation, standardizing the various bid-
ding procedures and clearing up the problem areas, could do much to
avoid future litigation in this field. RALPH L. HAwKms
APPENDIX
CONSTRUCION AND MAINTENANCE OF HIGHWAYS. ACW 47.28
RCW 47.28.050 CALL FOR BIDS. The Washington state highway
commission shall publish a call for bids for the construction of that high-
way according to the maps, plans, and specifications, once a week for at
least two consecutive weeks, next preceding the day set for receiving and
opening the bids, in not less than one trade paper and one other paper ...
Provided further, That when the estimated cost of a contract to be
awarded is five thousand dollars or less, including the cost of materials,
supplies, engineering, and equipment, the state highway commisison need
not publish a call for bids.
RCW 47.28.080 WITHDRAwAL OF BiDs-NEw BiDs-TIME FixED IN
CALL CONTROLS. Any person, firm or corporation proposing a bid for
the construction or improvement of any state highway in response to a
call for bids published therefor may withdraw such bid proposal without
forefeiture and without prejudice to the right of such bidder to file a
new bid proposal before the time fixed for the opening of such bid
proposals ...
RCW 47.28.090 OPENING OF BIDS AND AwARD OF CONTRACT-DE-
POSIT. At the time and place named in the call for bids the Washington
state highway commission shall publicly open and read the final figure in
each of the bid proposals properly filed and read only the bid items on the
three lowest bids, and shall award the contract to the lowest responsible
bidder unless the commission has for good cause, continued the date of
opening bids to a day certain, or rejected said bid: Provided, That any
bid may be rejected if the bidder has previously defaulted in the perform-
ance of and failed to complete a written public contract, or has been con-
victed of a crime arising from a previous public contract. All bids shall be
under sealed cover and accompanied by deposit in cash, certified check,
cashier's check, or surety bond in an amount equal to five percent of the
amount of the bid and no bid shall be considered unless the deposit is
enclosed therewith.
FmE Paiomcnow Disnucrs. RCW 52
RCW 52.12.110 CONTRACTS FOR, WORK OR PURCHASES-BIDs. When-
ever the cost of any work to be done or the purchase of any materials,
supplies, or equipment, will exceed the sum of one thousand' dollars, the
same shall be done by contract after a call for bids which shall be awarded
to the lowest responsible bidder, in accordance with the terms of RCW
39.24.010. Notice of the call for bids shall be given by posting notice
thereof in three public places in the district and by publication once each
week for two consecutive weeks, said posting and first publication to be
at least two weeks before the date fixed for opening of the bids, and such
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publication to be in a newspaper of general circulation within the district.
The commissioners shall have the power by resolution to reject any and
all bids and make further calls for bids in the same manner as the original
call. If no bid is received on the first call, the commissioners may readver-
tise and make a second call, or may enter into a contract without any
further call.
PORT Dismxcrs, PowERs. RCW 53.08
RCW 53.08.120 CONTRACTS FOR LABOR AND MATERIAL. All material
required by port district may be procured in the open market or by contract
and all work ordered may be done by contract or day labor. All such con-
tracts shall be let at public bidding upon notice published in newspaper
in the district at least ten days before the letting, calling for sealed bids
upon the work, plans and specifications for which shall then be on file in
the office of the commission for public inspection. The same notice may
call for bids on such work or material based upon plans and specifications
submitted by the bidder.
RCW 53.08.130 NOTIcE-AWARD OF CONTRACT. The notice shall
state generally the nature of the work to be done and require that bids be
sealed and filed with the commission at a time specified therein. Each bid
shall be accompanied by a bid proposal deposit in the form of a cashiers
check, money order, or surety bid bond to the commission for a sum not
less than five percent of the amount of the bid, and no bid shall be con-
sidered unless accompanied by such bid proposal deposit. At the time and
place named the bids shall be publicly opened and read and the commission
shall proceed to canvass the bids and may let the contract to the lowest
responsible bidder upon plans and specifications on file, or to the best
bidder submitting his own plans and specifications. If, in the opinion of
the commission, all bids are unsatisfactory, they may reject all of them and
readvertise, and in such case all such bid proposal deposits shall be re-
turned to the bidders; but if the contract is let, then all bid proposal
deposits shall be returned to the bidders, except that of the successful
bidder, which shall be retained until a contract is entered into for the
purchase of such materials or doing such work, and a bond given to the
port district for the performance of the contract and otherwise conditioned
as required by law, with sureties satisfactory to the commission. . . . If
said bidder fails to enter into the contract in accordance with his bid and
furnish such bond within ten days from the date at which he is notified
that he is the successful bidder, the check or money order and the amount
thereof shall be forfeited to the port district or the port district shall recover
the amount of the surety bid bond. ...
PuBLc UTILITY DisnTmS, GENERAL PROVISIONS. RCW 54.04
RCW 54.04.070 CONTRACTS FOR WORK OR MATERIALS-NOTICE-
EMERGENCY PURCHASES. All materials purchased and work ordered by
a district commission, the estimated cost of which is in excess of five
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thousand dollars, shall be by contract, except that a district commission
may have its own personnel perform work utilizing material of a worth
not exceeding thirty thousand dollars in value without a contract. Before
awarding such a contract, the commission shall publish a notice at least
thirty days before letting of the contract. . . . The commission may at
the same time and as part of the same notice, invite tenders for the work
or materials upon plans and specifications to be submitted by the bidders.
RCW 54.04.080 Bins - DEPOSIT - CONTRACT- BOND. The notice
shall state generally the work to be done, and shall call for proposals for
doing it, to be sealed and filed with the commission on or -before the time
named therein. Each bid shall be accompanied by a certified or cashier's
check, payable to the order of the commission, for a sum not less than five
percent of the amount of the bid, or accompanied by a bid bond in an
amount not less than five percent of the bid with a corporate surety licensed
to do business in the state, conditioned that the bidder will pay the district
as liquidated damages the amount specified in the bond unless he enters
into a contract in accordance with his bid and furnishes the performance
bond herein mentioned within ten days from the date on which he is notified
that he is the successful bidder. At the time and place named, the bids
shall be publicly opened and read, and the commission -shall canvass the
bids, and may let the contract to the lowest responsible bidder upon the
plans and specifications on file, or to the best bidder submitting his own
plans and specifications. . . . The commission may reject all bids and
readvertise. . . . If the bidder fails to enter into the contract and furnish
the bond within ten days from the date at which he is notified that he is
the successful bidder, his check and the amount thereof shall be forfeited
to the district.
SEWER Dismcrs, PowERs. RCW 56.08
RCW 56.08.070 CONTRACTS FOR LABOR AND MATERIALS-CALL FOR
BiDs-AWARD OF CONTRACT. All materials purchased and work ordered,
the estimated cost of which is in exess of one thousand dollars shall be let
by contract. Before awarding any such contract the board of sewer com-
missioners shall cause to be published in some newspaper in general circu-
lation throughout the county where the district is located at least once, ten
days before the letting of such contract, inviting sealed proposals for such
work, plans and specifications which must at the time of publication of
such notice be on file in the office of the board of sewer commissioners
subject to public inspection. . . . Each bid shall be accompanied by a
certified check payable to the order of the county treasurer for a sum not
less than five percent of the amount of the bid and no bid shall be considered
unless accompanied by such check. At the time and place named such
bids shall be publicly opened and read and the board of sewer commissioners
shall proceed to canvass the bids and may let such contract to the lowest
responsible bidder upon plans and specifications; Provided, however, That
no contract shall be let in excess of the cost of said materials or work, or
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if in the opinion of the board of sewer commissioners all bids are unsatis-
factory they may reject all of them and readvertise and in such case all
checks shall be returned to the bidders.
WATER Dxsamcrs, PowmEs. RCW 57.08
RCW 57.08.050 CONTRACTS FOR MATERIALS AND WORK-NoTICE-
BIDs. The board of water commissioners shall have authority to create
and fill such positions and fix salaries and bonds thereof as it may by reso-
lution provide. All materials purchased and work ordered, the estimated
cost of which is in excess of one thousand dollars shall be let by contract;
but before awarding any such contract the board of water commissioners
shall cause to be published in some newspaper in general circulation through-
out the county where the district is located at least once ten days before
the letting of such contract, inviting sealed proposals for such work, plans
and specifications which must at the time of publication of such notice be
on file in the office of the board of water commissioners subject to public
inspection. . . . Each bid shall be accompanied by a certified check pay-
able to the order of the county treasurer for a sum not less than five percent
of the amount of the bid and no bid shall be considered unless accompanied
by such check. At the time and place named such bids shall be publicly
opened and read and the. board of. water commissioners shall proceed to
canvass the bids and may let such contract to the lowest responsible bidder
upon plans and specifications on file or to the best bidder submitting his
own plans and specifications: Provided, however, . . . if in the opinion
of the board of water commissioners all bids are unsatisfactory they may
reject all of them and readvertise. . . . If said bidder fails to enter into
said contract in accordance with said bid and furnish such bond within
ten days from the date at which he is notified that he is the successful
bidder, the said check and the amount thereof shall be forfeited to the
water district:- Provided "further, That if in the judgment of the water
commissioners such work can be performed at less cost under the district's
own superintendence than by letting a contract, then the district may cause
such work to be performed independent of contract and without calling
for bids where the estimated cost of such work is in a sum less than five
thousand dollars.
CrTEs AND TowNs, LocAL IMPROVEMENTS, ETC. RCW 35.43
RCW 35.43.190 WORK-BY CONTRACT OR BY CITY. All local im-
provements, the funds for the making of which are derived in whole or in
part from assessments upon property specially benefited shall be made
either by the city or town itself or by contract on competitive bids. The
city or town may reject any and all bids. The board, officer, or authority
charged with the duty of letting contracts for local improvements shall
determine whether the local improvements shall be done by contract or
by the city or town itself.
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PFuBc HEALTH AND SATY, Punic HosPrnI. DIsTaCTs.
RCW 70.44
RCW 70.44.140 CONTRACTS FOR MATERIAL AND WORK-CALL FOR
BIDs. All materials purchased and work ordered, the estimated cost of
which is in excess of five thousand dollars, shall be by contract. Before
awarding any such contract, the commission shall cause to be published a
notice at least thirty days before the letting of said contract, inviting sealed
proposals for such work . . . Provided, however, That the commission
may at the same time, and as part of the same notice, invite tenders for
said work or materials upon plans and specifications to be submitted by
bidders .... Each bid shall be accompanied by a certified check, payable
to the order of the commission, for a sum not less than five percent of the
amount of the bid, and no bid shall be considered unless accompanied by
such check. At. the time and place named, such bids shall be publicly
opened and read, and the commission shall proceed to canvass the bids, and
may let such contract to the lowest responsible bidder upon plans and
specifications on file, or to the best bidder submitting his own plans and
specifications ....
FLOOD CoNTRoL DisnmcTs. RCW 86.05
RCW 86.05.430 CONTRACTS-PmLIC BIDDING--NoTICE. All district
contracts for construction, labor, or materials entering therein, shall be
awarded at public bidding, except as herein otherwise provided. A notice
calling for sealed proposals shall be published for a period of two weeks
(three consecutive weekly issues) and the date of first publication shall be
at least fifteen days prior to the day of opening such bids. Such proposals
shall be accompanied by a certified check for the amount specified in the
form of proposal, to guarantee compliance with the bid, and shall be opened
in public at the time and place designated in the notice. The contract shall
be awarded to the lowest and best responsible bidder: Provided, That the
board shall have authority to reject any and all bids.
PUBLic ScHooLS A" CoLLEs, DISTICTs. ICW 28.58
RCW 28.58.135 DIRECTORS-ADvERTISING FOR BIs-BI PROCEDURE
-EMERGENCIES. When, in the opinion of the board of directors of any
school district, the cost of any furniture, supplies, equipment, building, im-
provements or repairs, or other work or purchases will equal or exceed the
sum of twenty-five hundred dollars, complete plans and specifications for
such work or purchases shall be prepared and notice by publication given
in at least one newspaper of general circulation within the district, once
each week for two consecutive weeks, of the intention to receive bids therefor
and that specifications and other information may be examined at the office
of the board: Provided. . . . The bids shall be in writing and shall be
opened and read in public on the date and in the place named in the notice
and after being opened shall be filed for public inspection. The contract
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for the work or purchase shall be awarded to the lowest responsible bidder
as defined in RCW 43.19.1911. Any or all bids may be rejected for good
cause ...
STATE GOVERNMENT-EXECUTIVE, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
INsTrrTTIONS. RCW 43.19
RCW 43.19.1911 LETTING CONTRACT-LowEST RESPONSIBLE BIDDER,
DETERMINATION - PUBLIC INSPECTION OF BIDS. When purchases are
made through competitive bidding, the contract shall be let to the lowest
responsible bidder. . . . In determining "lowest responsible bidder," in
addition to price, the following elements shall be given consideration:
1. The ability, capacity and skill of the bidder to perform the contract or
provide the service required;
2. The character, integrity, reputation, judgment, experience and effi-
ciency of the bidder;
3. Whether the bidder can perform the contract within the time specified;
4. The quality of performance of previous contracts or services;
5. The previous and existing compliance by the bidder with law relating
to the contract or services;
6. Such other information as may be secured having a bearing on the
decision to award the contract.
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